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Making sense of knowing how and knowing that 
Gerard Lum 
Noting the resurgence of interest in Ryle’s knowing how / knowing that distinction the 
paper examines the viability of this distinction along with claims to reduce one form of 
knowing to the other.  It is suggested that by separating questions about the nature of 
knowledge from questions about third person attributions of knowledge, it is possible to 
determine the circumstances in which use of the distinction is and is not viable. By 
drawing attention to one important feature of Ryle’s argument and suggesting a 
corrective to another it is argued that by Ryle’s own account the distinction cannot 
properly be regarded as an epistemological distinction.  The paper concludes by 
considering some negative educational implications of the assumption that it is possible 
to distinguish two kinds of knowledge. 
 
 
The last decade or so has seen a resurgence of interest in Ryle’s knowing how / knowing that 
(KH/KT) distinction, prompted in no small part by Stanley and Williamson’s (2001) 
provocative intellectualist reading of the distinction.  Recent work has seen the battle lines 
drawn between those who essentially defend Ryle’s original distinction, or some variant of it, 
and those who would claim that one form of knowing reduces to the other.  It is not my 
intention here to rehearse the arguments of the various protagonists but rather to examine 
afresh the viability of the idea that knowledge is of essentially two kinds.  By drawing 
attention to one particularly crucial feature of Ryle’s argument – well known yet 
conspicuously absent from much of the KH/KT debate – and suggesting a corrective to 
another, I will argue that even by Ryle’s own account the distinction cannot properly be 
regarded as an epistemological distinction, that is, as demarcating two different kinds of 
knowledge.  However, this is not to say that we are necessarily mistaken in our ordinary use 
of the terms knowing how and knowing that.  Indeed, it turns out to be of no small 
significance that the distinction is deeply rooted in our language and our attempts to articulate 
what it is that other people know.  What matters, I will argue, is being clear about where our 
use of the KH/KT distinction does make sense and where it doesn’t.   
 
REVISITING RYLE’S USE OF THE DISTINCTION  
Ryle’s use of the KH/KT distinction in The Concept of Mind is clearly bound up with his 
wider ambitions.  Paul Snowden (2004) has noted how Ryle’s use of the distinction is closely 
connected with his attempt to refute the ‘Intellectualist Legend’, the idea that 'the intelligent 
execution of an operation must embody two processes, one of doing, and another of 
theorising' (Ryle, 1949, p. 32).  And Stanley and Williamson (2001) have similarly focused 
on Ryle’s efforts to dismiss the intellectualist legend.  Yet it is important not to lose sight of 
Ryle’s still broader purpose, that of demonstrating the alleged misuse of a single concept, 
along with the range mental epithets that people use in the supposedly mistaken belief that in 
so doing they are referring to some inner mental realm, some ostensible ‘ghost in the 
machine’ (ibid.).  The difference between these differently construed aims is crucial because 
they suggest two fundamentally different kinds of question.  Indeed, one difficulty with the 
The Concept of Mind is precisely its ambiguity, that is, whether Ryle’s overarching concern is 
with the nature of mind and knowledge, or with our descriptions of particular minds, that is, 
with our use of mental epithets.  Even Ryle’s title is ambiguous on this score.  But what is 
clear in Ryle, and is stated as the express purpose of his chapter on knowing how and 
knowing that, is his intention ‘to show that when we describe people as exercising qualities of 
mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are 
effects; we are referring to those overt acts and utterances themselves’ (p. 25).  This aspect of 
Ryle’s argument is certainly well known, yet its implications for the KH/KT distinction seem 
not to have had the attention they deserve.  For if in describing people as ‘knowing how’ or 
‘knowing that’ we are in fact referring to ‘overt acts and utterances’ rather than 
knowledgeable states of mind then there may be an important sense in which by Ryle’s own 
account these terms cannot be assumed to represent an epistemological distinction. 
 
It is clear from the passage where Ryle introduces the distinction that the terms knowing how 
and knowing that are not meant to have any special technical meaning; rather, these are 
simply terms used in ordinary language.  As he says, ‘We speak of learning how ... as well as 
learning that...; of finding out how .... as well as finding out that’ (p. 28).  Ryle’s interest here 
is with ‘our descriptions of people as knowing’ (my emphasis; ibid.), with how we speak 
about what other people know.  He sees this distinction as connected with the distinction that 
can be made between people’s ‘operations’ and ‘the truths that they learn’ (ibid.); in other 
words, we speak of a person’s knowing how or knowing that according to whether what they 
know is made manifest in the form of acts or in the form of utterances.  Ryle does not venture 
to say why we should have an interest in making this distinction, but it seems reasonable to 
suggest that by thus indicating how a person’s knowledge is made manifest we are able to 
distinguish more clearly between a person’s knowing one thing and knowing another.  It 
allows us to distinguish between, say, a case of knowing how to ride a bicycle and a case of 
knowing facts about cycling in a way that that would not be clear if we were simply to talk of 
a person having ‘knowledge of cycling’ (see Lum, 2009).  Yet not all manifestations of 
knowing are amenable to being categorised in this way: the writing of an essay, for example, 
being a case in point.  Such examples can be explained by recognising their ambiguity as 
manifestations, being at once both ‘act’ and ‘utterance’, to use Ryle’s terminology. For the 
moment suffice it to say that we make a fatal move if we leap too quickly to the idea that 
such cases demonstrate the application of two kinds of knowledge. 
 
Certainly there is cause to be circumspect about taking commonplace references to knowing 
how and knowing that too literally.  If someone says ‘John knows that the key is under the 
mat’ in response to the question ‘Does John knows how to get in?’ they would be attributing 
to John rather more than knowledge of a fact; they would in effect be saying that ‘John 
knows how to get in’.  Similarly, we might say of someone that they know how to answer a 
question or know how to say the right thing when we mean nothing other than they know that 
the answer is such and such, or know that they should say certain things.  But such matters 
aside, the main point here is that we can acknowledge that the KH/KT distinction does have 
perfectly viable applications, in English at least, when used to indicate the manner in which a 
person’s knowing is made manifest and thus indicate more clearly what it is they know.   
 
Now Ryle’s point as regards our lack of access to other minds is incontrovertible.  The 
difficulty, of course, as Ryle was all too aware, is that it seems tantamount to behaviourism. 
More specifically, it leaves us incapable of explaining how we are able to distinguish cases 
perhaps identical in terms of overt behaviour yet seemingly very different in terms of what is 
known.  To use Ryle’s example, how are we able to distinguish the skilful trippings and 
tumblings of the clever clown from the ‘visibly similar trippings and tumblings of the clumsy 
man’ (p. 33)?  As is well known, Ryle’s solution was to invoke the notion of dispositions: 
what distinguishes the clown is his disposition to act the way he does.  The problem here lies 
with Ryle’s explanation of ‘disposition’:  
 
To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a 
particular change, it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a 
particular change, when a particular change is realized. (Ryle, p. 43) 
 
The difficulty with this – despite Ryle’s insistence that to have a dispositional property is ‘not 
to be in a particular state’ – is precisely that it encourages the thought that what is at issue is 
some feature or ‘property’ of the knower.  This is where the question of Ryle’s substantive 
agenda becomes crucial.  If Ryle is trying to say something about the nature of mind then it 
might be apt for him to talk about the knower possessing certain properties.  Yet this is not 
what Ryle has led us to believe; the thrust of his argument thus far has centred not so much 
on the nature of mind but, rather, on our descriptions of particular minds, what it is possible 
for us to mean when we apply intelligence epithets, and so on.   
 
The important thing here is that questions about the nature of mind and knowledge are 
logically distinct from questions about what it is possible to know and say about the mind of 
particular person or about what a particular person knows.  In much of the discussion 
surrounding this topic the difference between these two kinds of question tends to be 
overlooked, indeed Ryle himself can be seen continually to conflate these two kinds of 
question.  But I want to suggest that in order to be clear about the KH/KT distinction, where 
the distinction is and is not valid, it is vital to separate these two sorts of question.  In 
education the difference has an obvious practical bearing, the one kind of question being 
pertinent in connection with the curriculum, with how we conceive of what learners need to 
know, the other being relevant in connection with assessment and the processes by which it is 
possible to determine what particular learners know.  And we can take Ryle’s puzzle of the 
clown/clumsy man as posing a question of the latter kind, being essentially a question about 
how it is possible, given our patent lack of access to other minds, to determine what a person 
knows in contradistinction to how they behave.   
 
Now there is an important sense in which the facility to determine what a person knows in 
contradistinction to how they behave is fundamental to the business of teaching.  Consider 
the not at all unusual situation in which a teacher, on asking a pupil a question and receiving 
the correct answer, just knows that he doesn’t really know. Or conversely, she might feel 
confident that the pupil does know in spite of not receiving the correct answer.  If asked 
whether or not the pupil knows she would rightly say that it depends on what we mean by 
‘know’.  She would likely explain the matter in quasi ontological terms, as a discrepancy 
between the ‘outer’ and the ‘inner’, as a difference between the pupil’s outward behaviour 
and what he ‘really’ knows.  But of course this cannot be right. In this much Ryle is surely 
correct: the teacher has no privileged access to the realm of the mental, the only evidence she 
has is that of outward behaviour.   
 
The idea that the pupil might possess a certain disposition or complex of dispositions seems 
on the face of it to be of little help here.  How might such a disposition be discerned?  
Perhaps, we might suppose, this particular instance of behaviour is the latest in a series of 
similar instances and the teacher has made some sort of inference or calculation based on 
those past cases in order to surmise that the pupil has a certain ‘dispositional property’.  Yet 
this is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.1 Not least, it does nothing to divest us of the 
apparent need to distinguish between the ‘outer’ and the ‘inner’; it would still be necessary to 
distinguish between the pupil’s behaviour and what he ‘really’ knows in order that such cases 
could be regarded as ‘similar instances’.  And this kind of explanation fails to account for 
situations in which there is no history of similar cases.  As it stands, Ryle’s appeal to the 
notion of dispositions appears lacking and if we are going to be clear about the ways in which 
the KH/KT distinction may or may not be valid we need a more plausible explanation.  
Accordingly, I want to suggest a corrective to Ryle’s scheme of things which might allow us 
to partially rehabilitate his notion of dispositions, although I should stress that it is far from 
certain that Ryle would be in agreement with what I am going to propose.  
 
A CORRECTIVE TO RYLE’S NOTION OF DISPOSITIONS 
If I am asked whether my elderly aunt would be able to negotiate the London underground so 
as to get from Paddington Station to Russell Square, something she has never done before, 
my answer would be based not on any calculation of previous cases, but rather, on my 
understanding of my aunt and her capabilities.  Donald Davidson (2001) has commented on 
the extraordinary facility we have to draw on any diverse and fragmentary evidence we have 
about a person and somehow ‘assemble such material into a convincing picture of a mind’ (p. 
15).  It would seem that the processes involved in our doing this are largely tacit and 
unconscious; as Davidson says, ‘we know how to do it without necessarily knowing how we 
do it’ (ibid.).  Indeed, there is ample empirical evidence in the psychology of perception to 
suggest that this is something we instinctively and automatically do for each and every person 
we know. 2 
 
I have suggested elsewhere (Lum, 2012) that this has unrecognised implications for 
educational assessment, not least because it suggests that whenever we set out to determine 
what a person knows we have at our disposal not one but two logically distinct kinds of 
judgement.  On the one hand we might bring to bear judgements of identity whereby we seek 
merely to confirm the presence or otherwise of some specific, predetermined behavioural 
manifestation (e.g. ‘he gave the correct answer’).  This is the way we ordinarily think of 
assessment, particularly when employing formal processes centred on ‘objective’ criteria.3  
But in addition to this we can also be seen to employ what I have dubbed judgements of 
significance by which we actively draw on any available evidence that we judge to be 
relevant to the matters in hand.  It would seem that by this means we are able, in effect, to 
construct a ‘picture of a mind’ which, in turn, allows us to judge what a person knows (e.g. 
‘but he didn’t really know’).  Such ‘pictures’ are constantly updated as evidence becomes 
available, with judgements of identity continually being monitored as to whether they are 
consistent or at variance with the ‘picture’ we have of a person and their capabilities.  Since 
by this means we are able to judge what a person may or may not be disposed to do in 
particular circumstances we can partially reinstate Ryle’s notion of dispositions, not as a 
property of the person but, rather, as part of the ‘picture’ we have of the person.   
 
Whether Rye would accept this modification is, as I say, far from certain.  The essential 
difficulty for Ryle is that his positivistic leanings often cause him to focus on the supposed 
‘object’ of attention, i.e. ‘the knower’, when the focus should more properly be on the 
observer and the processes brought to bear by the observer in making judgements about what 
a person knows.4  That said, Ryle does concede something of an interpretative role for the 
observer in acknowledging that in order to understand a person’s ‘deeds and words’ it is 
necessary to have ‘some degree of competence’ (Ryle, 1949, p. 54) in common with the 
performer.  What I am proposing is certainly consistent with Ryle’s thesis about our lack of 
access to other minds, whilst being such as to avoid the accusation of behaviourism.  It also 
explains the folk psychology of mental epithets, our apparent conviction that we can know 
and say things about a person’s mind in contrast to their behaviour.  What is missing in Ryle 
is the sheer extent of what the observer brings to the situation: in the case of the 
clown/clumsy man an understanding of the kind of things that happen in circus tents, certain 
expectations as to how people dressed in certain costumes are likely to behave, and so on.  
That this is so is evidenced by the possibility that the observer can get it wrong: if the clown 
were to have a nasty unintended fall the audience may well see it as part of the act; were he to 
dress in a business suit and perform his routine in the high street it is likely that concerned 
bystanders would come to his aid.  But the more immediate thing is that our acknowledging 
these two kinds of judgement allows a more plausible explanation of how it is possible to 
determine what a person knows in contradistinction to what they say or do.  And this in turn, 
I want to suggest, allows for a more coherent account of the notions of knowing how and 
knowing that in relation to attributions of knowledge. 
 
A QUESTION OF KNOWLEDGE ATTRIBUTION 
We can concur with Ryle when he says, in effect, that our judgements about what other 
people know must necessarily be based on manifest evidence.  What matters – and what is 
conspicuously missing in Ryle – is what we do with that evidence, whether we confine our 
judgements to specific behavioural manifestations, or whether our judgements are such as to 
draw on any relevant evidence by way of constructing a ‘picture of a mind’.  It is precisely 
because Ryle appears to confine attention to specific ‘acts and utterances’ that he has been 
taken to task for seeming to equate knowledge with those acts and utterances.5 And this has 
generally come to be seen as the main bone of contention between the anti-intellectualist and 
intellectualist positions, with those who hold the latter position being at pains to show that 
outward behaviour is either not necessary or not sufficient for knowledge.  Indeed, it might 
be said that much of the burgeoning debate surrounding the KH/KT distinction over the past 
decade or so has been less about the relation between these two ostensible forms of 
knowledge than about the relation between know-how and ability,6 with particular 
puzzlement being caused by the fact that attributions of know-how sometimes entail ability 
attributions and sometimes do not.7  
 
Stanley and Williamson offer the following much discussed illustration in their attempt to 
distance know-how from ability: 
 
...a ski instructor may know how to perform a certain complex stunt, without being able to perform it 
herself. Similarly, a master pianist who loses both of her arms in a tragic car accident still knows how to 
play the piano. But she has lost her ability to do so. 
(Stanley and Williamson, 2001, p. 416) 
 
The suggestion, of course, is that in each case we would be bound to concede that the person 
has knowledge even though they are not able to do the thing in question.  Yet this is 
misleading.  First, we need to be clear that this is a question about the attribution of 
knowledge; that is, a question of whether and how we would be justified in saying that 
knowledge obtains in a particular case.  Seen thus we can recognise that the two examples are 
actually very different.  How would we know that the ski instructor ‘know(s) how to perform 
a certain complex stunt’?  Presumably, we might suppose, because she can evidently teach 
her students to perform the stunt.  Accordingly, this is not a case of knowing without ability 
but, rather, a case in which it is necessary to acknowledge the difference between knowing 
how to do one thing and knowing how to do another.8  What the ski instructor knows is how 
to instruct her students to do the stunt, and this knowledge is different from the knowledge 
required to perform the stunt.  In a different case the reverse might be true: someone might be 
able to do the stunt and yet not know how to teach others how to do it.  Again, it would be a 
case of knowing one thing as opposed to knowing something else.   As is so often the case in 
the literature on this topic, the matter comes down to ambiguities of language, in this case the 
deceptive ambiguity of ‘know how to perform’.9 
 
The case of the pianist is different. But here again, with our modification in place, Ryle can 
be vindicated.  On what grounds would we judge that the master pianist knows how to play 
the piano?  Surely, it could only be on the basis of available evidence.  Given our 
modification to Ryle’s account of dispositions we can say that we would deduce what she 
knows from the ‘picture’ we have of her, construed in turn from what we have gleaned about 
her history, her years of training, her past performances, and so on.  Again, insofar as we 
understand Ryle as saying that our judgements about what other people know are necessarily 
based on outward manifest evidence his case still stands.10  
 
Here is another attempt to question the relation between knowledge and its manifestations, 
one that has been widely cited in the literature: 
 
Suppose a famous dancer was to perform before an audience, an item from his repertoire to which he has 
himself given the following title: 
A performance of Improvisation No. 15 
To the astonishment of a member of his audience who just happens to be an expert on communications, 
the movements of the dancer turn out to resemble an accurate (movement perfect) semaphore version of 
Gray's 'Elegy', though the dancer is quite unaware of this fact. 
(Carr, 1979, p. 407) 
 
Yet again, understood as a question of how and what it is possible to know about what the 
dancer knows there is no mystery.  On the evidence of the performance alone the 
communications expert might assume, wrongly, that the dancer knows semaphore and that 
the allusion to Gray’s Elegy is intentional.  Someone who is in a position to draw on a 
broader range of evidence would judge otherwise.  By definition, judgements of significance 
always provide a better indication of what a person knows over any judgement of identity 
because they are able to draw on any or all available evidence.  It is precisely by this means 
that we are able to discern fluke performances or performances not representative of a 
person’s true abilities, instances of cheating, and so on. Again, none of this does anything to 
undermine Ryle’s point about our lack of access to other minds and his claim, in effect, that 
our judgements about what other people know are necessarily based on outward manifest 
evidence.  And it is worth noting how so many of the examples used to illustrate this issue – 
the often bizarre references to such things as stunt skiers, pianists (or chefs) with no arms, 
guitar teachers unable to play well, pilots who can fly but don’t know how to fly, and so on – 
can be seen to conflate the two kinds of question at issue here, that is, questions about the 
nature of knowledge, and questions about how and what it is possible to know about what a 
particular person knows.   
 
So where does this leave us as regards knowing how and knowing that?   Certainly, the terms 
have application in circumstances where it is sufficient to denote the ‘overt acts and 
utterances’ that are the outward manifestations of knowing.  Associating our third person 
knowledge attributions with specific acts or utterances often serves to convey more clearly 
what it is a person knows.  In informal or non-critical situations these reports of judgements 
of identity – for that is essentially what they are – will often be sufficient.  However, such 
attributions are always susceptible to being trumped by reports based on judgements of 
significance, particularly in circumstances where high stakes are attached to those 
judgements, and judgements of this kind are not amenable to being couched in these terms.  
In such circumstances we typically abandon references to knowing how and knowing that in 
favour of terms such as ‘knowledge’, ‘understanding’, ‘comprehension’, ‘grasp’, and so on – 
notions which are characteristically un-bifurcated and clearly not associated with specific 
manifestations.  Indeed, in such situations we may effectively retract attributions of 
knowledge implicit in our reports of a person’s acts and utterances.  The teacher of our earlier 
example would say of her pupil: ‘He gave the correct answer but he didn’t really 
know/understand/comprehend/grasp’.  She would not say ‘He knew that x but he didn’t really 
know that x’ or ‘He knew how to y but he didn’t really know how to y’.11  This is not a point 
about grammar or language use; it is rather that attributions of knowledge derived from 
judgements of significance always take precedence over attributions based on judgements of 
identity since by definition they draw on a wider range of evidence.12 
 
Notwithstanding the above point, the notions of knowing how and knowing that can 
sometimes have a role in connection with judgements of significance.  I might deduce from 
the ‘picture’ I have of a person that they would probably know how to dismantle a carburettor 
or know that the capital city of Australia is Canberra, even though to I have no knowledge of 
them ever doing or saying either of these things.  In other words, we can indicate something 
of what a person knows by indicating how their knowledge might be made manifest.  
Importantly, however, I could never properly represent what I know of another person’s mind 
in these terms because the ‘picture’ that enables me to make such knowledge attributions is 
not itself bifurcated in this way.  It will be in large part indistinct and amorphous, an 
amalgam of half-remembered histories, diverse episodes and variously gleaned impressions.  
But it is none the less important for that, for ultimately it is by this means that we are able to 
make the very best estimation of what another person knows. 
 
We might say, then, that the notions of knowing how and knowing that have entirely viable 
uses in the context of third person knowledge attributions.  In this much Ryle was correct.  
Importantly, however, not all of our knowledge attributions can be couched in these terms.  
While judgements of identity are necessarily associated with specific behavioural 
manifestations this is not the case with judgements of significance.  Indeed, whenever it is 
important to provide the fullest account of what a person knows we almost invariably 
abandon our use of such terms in favour of an account by which we purposely attempt to 
describe knowledge rather than its manifestations.  Nowhere is this more evident than in 
circumstances in which judgements of identity (e.g. ‘He was able to do x...’) are 
countermanded by judgements of significance (e.g. ‘...but he didn’t know what he was 
doing’).13  There is thus an important sense in which the more serious we are about our 
attributions of knowledge the less resort we will have to the notions of knowing how and 
knowing that.  This, I want to suggest, explains how the KH/KT distinction sits in relation to 
questions about the attribution of knowledge.  But it is when we turn to the other kind of 
question, the sort of question concerned not with what a particular person knows but with 
how we should properly characterise the knowledge at issue that the more serious limitations 
of the KH/KT distinction become apparent.  
 
A QUESTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
While in some places, such as with his illustration of the clown/clumsy man, Ryle is 
concerned with the question of how and what it is possible for us to know about what another 
person knows – for example, how we are able to ‘recognise that a performance is an exercise 
of a skill’ (1949, p. 33) – in other places he is clearly concerned with questions of the second 
kind, that is, questions about the nature of knowledge.  And it is in this vein that Ryle 
challenges the intellectualist legend by which account, according to Ryle, it is assumed that a 
chef ‘must recite his recipes to himself before he can cook’, or the hero ‘lend his inner ear to 
some appropriate moral imperative’ (p. 29) before being able to save a drowning man, and so 
on. The question here, then, is about the kind of knowledge involved in acting in such and 
such a way.   
 
The KH/KT distinction enters into Ryle’s attack on the intellectualist legend by way of his 
trying to show that the knowledge required for intelligent action does not consist in the prior 
consideration of propositions, rules, maxims, principles, etc.  Now it would have been 
entirely possible for Ryle to make this case without invoking the KH/KT distinction at all; he 
might reasonably have offered an account of intelligent action in which the prior 
manipulation of propositions, rules, maxims, etc., could be seen to play little or no part.  The 
apparent advantage for Ryle, in characterising such prior mental operations as ‘knowing that’ 
as opposed to ‘knowing how’ is that it lends prima facie plausibility to his case: if we accept 
that the kind of knowledge required for intelligent action is a knowing how as opposed to a 
knowing that, then it would seem to follow that anything characterised as knowing that is 
simply the wrong kind of knowledge.  It is thus that Ryle effectively becomes committed to 
knowing how and knowing that as epistemological categories rather than merely the means 
by which we indicate how a person’s knowledge is made manifest.  And of course a good 
many since Ryle have followed him down this very same path, accepting at face value this 
dual epistemic scheme of things.   
 
Certainly some have claimed to repudiate the distinction.  Stanley and Williamson purport to 
‘contest the thesis that there is a fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that’; yet this claim is immediately thrown into question when they add: 
‘Knowledge-how is simply a species of knowledge-that’ (2001, p. 411).  For to suggest that 
A is a ‘species’ of B is not to deny the existence of A. It is not to say that when we refer to 
instances of A we are mistaken.  Neither is it to say that we are mistaken in distinguishing 
between A and B.  Rather, to claim that one kind of knowledge is a species of the other is to 
suggest that one stands in a certain relation to the other, or more precisely, that one has a 
certain kind of priority over the other.  Similarly with those who claim to reduce the 
distinction in the other direction, such as with Hetherington’s contention that ‘To know that p 
is to know how to perform various actions’ (2006, p. 72).  Hetherington is right when he 
characterises the intellectualist position as affording ‘conceptual centrality’ (ibid.) to knowing 
that, but by the same token he merely assumes the same sort of ‘centrality’ for knowing how.   
 
None of this conceptual gerrymandering does anything to dissolve the KH/KT distinction but 
it does testify to the fundamental instability of these supposed concepts in the context of 
questions about the nature of knowledge.  This instability arises from the fact that each might 
variously be conceived in either conceptually ‘thin’ or ‘thick’ terms: either as little more than 
perfunctory act or utterance, or something that is epistemologically and cognitively far 
richer.14  Which way the priorities run is an entirely arbitrary matter, dependent only the prior 
conceptual commitments or predilections of the commentator.  There is no means of 
adjudicating between thin/thick and thick/thin conceptions of knowing how and knowing that 
because the assumption upon which both are founded is mistaken.  It is simply assumed that 
the distinction has some substantive epistemological basis.  The mere fact that we distinguish 
between acts and utterances as a means of differentiating a person’s knowing one thing and 
knowing something else is taken to imply two kinds of knowledge.  The contingent facts of 
language use are often recruited to bolster this assumption, yet it is clear that when attributing 
knowledge, we say ‘S knows how to x’ or ‘S knows that y’ we mean nothing other that what 
S knows – whatever that might be – is such as would enable S to act in such and such a way 
or produce such and such an utterance.  We might equally determine that what S knows is 
such as could manifest itself both in certain acts and in certain utterances.  But the essential 
point here is that our use of such locutions in the context of knowledge attributions neither 
entails nor necessitates two kinds of knowledge.   
 
Those who have been keen to show that know-how can obtain in the absence of outward 
manifestations, or vice versa, have missed full the significance of this fact.  Far from 
establishing the priority of one form of knowing over the other it should more properly be 
regarded as demonstrating the important sense in which knowledge cannot be conceived in 
terms of its manifestations and thus in terms of either knowing how or knowing that.  
Consider the following by no means unusual scenario: 
 
A factory production line is in full swing when suddenly the machines grind to a halt. Alarm bells ring 
and warning lights flash; a maintenance technician arrives and makes his way to one of a hundred 
electrical control panels each interconnected perhaps with several miles of cabling. He opens the control 
panel, takes a screwdriver from his pocket and makes a small adjustment to just one of several hundred 
components. Closing the control panel he presses some buttons and the production line bursts into life. 
The question is, how is it possible to account for what the technician knows? His performance did not 
require the conscious manipulation of propositions or facts – and neither did it require any particular 
physical dexterity.             
         (Lum, 2009, p. 56)   
What we can say is that the knowledge requirements here are considerable and such as would 
typically require several years’ formal classroom-based provision and extensive off-the-job 
training, not to mention a good deal of post-qualification experience.  If we wished merely to 
make an attribution of knowledge we might say that the technician ‘knows how to reset the 
overload relay’ – the ‘knows how’ locution serving to indicate that he has the wherewithal to 
effect the doing of something.  The difficulty with this locution – centred on the simple 
physical act of pressing a button – is that it fails quite radically to identify the knowledge at 
issue.    To see the extent of this failure, suppose that a machine operator who had previously 
observed the technician at work took it upon himself to ape the technician’s actions.  Of 
course he would have no way of knowing whether the action was appropriate in this 
particular case, still less what its consequences might be.  With no understanding of what he 
was doing he would have no idea whether further investigation was needed; he would be 
unaware of the risks posed to equipment, his safety and that of others.  What the machine 
operator would lack is not merely some part of what the technician knows but virtually all of 
what he knows.  Yet it would still be true to say, in the judgement of identity sense, that the 
machine operator ‘knows how to reset the overload relay’. 
 
Now it might be thought that we could give a better account of what the technician knows by 
adding further attributions couched in these terms.  Perhaps we could say that unlike the 
machine operator the technician also ‘knows how to distinguish different kinds of faults’, 
‘knows that it is dangerous to...,’ and so on.   This much is true and certainly on this basis we 
could easily determine that the technician knows things that the operator does not know.  Yet 
this would be to miss the point, for the question here is not how we might assess what the 
technician knows but, rather, what it is the technician knows that equips him to do the task.  
And the difficulty here is that there is simply no evidence that any such ‘extra’ acts and 
utterances were involved in his performance, either overtly or even – and Ryle was surely 
correct on this point – as private, silent performances in the technician’s mind.  
 
The crucial thing here is to recognise how our acts and utterances are derivative rather than 
constitutive of what we know.  Take, for instance, someone who drives for a living and has 
come to have a good knowledge of central London.  They are able to find their way around, 
recognise landmarks, plot in their mind how best to get from A to B, etc.  Suppose it to be 
true of this person that they know how to get from Camden to Charing Cross, that they know 
that The National Gallery is in Trafalgar Square, and so on.  If we wanted to assess what the 
driver knows we could imagine testing them on a selection of just these kinds of things.  But 
this is not to say that what the driver knows is the sum total of some such list of acts and 
utterances.  Importantly, such a list could never be complete because it would always be 
possible to elicit further acts or utterances.  If asked, he could perhaps tell us whether the 
stonework of Westminster Abbey is lighter or darker in colour than St Pauls, even though the 
thought had never before crossed his mind.  And his knowledge would enable him to 
undertake any number of journeys he has never made before.  Indeed, what the driver knows 
could give rise to a virtually infinite number of acts and utterances.  There is thus an 
important sense in which any specification couched in terms of knowing how and/or knowing 
that will necessarily underdetermine the knowledge that is substantively at issue.   
We get a sense of the extent of this shortfall by considering the knowledge we bring to bear 
in our use of language.  Take, for example, the sentence ‘She gave him her key and he 
opened the door’.   As John Searle (1995) says, in linguistic pragmatics it is a moot point 
whether it is actually said or just implied that the door was opened with the key, that the door 
was opened after she gave him the key, and so on.  Either way, there is broad agreement ‘that 
there is a certain underdetermination of what is said by the literal meaning of this sentence’ 
(p. 131).  But in fact this, on Searle’s view, is to understate the matter: 
I wish to say there is a radical underdetermination of what is said by the literal meaning of the sentence.  
There is nothing in the literal meaning of the sentence ... to block the interpretation, He opened the door 
with her key by bashing the door down with the key ; the key weighed two hundred pounds and was in 
the shape of an axe. Or, He swallowed both the door and the key and he inserted the key in the lock by 
the peristaltic contraction of his gut. 
(Searle, 1995, p. 131) 
 
According to Searle, our ability to understand even the simplest linguistic construction is 
dependent upon our having an extensive ‘Background’ understanding of how the world 
works, an understanding that is presumed by rather than contained in the constructions 
themselves. This is significant for our purposes because it would seem to suggest that there is 
a certain kind of epistemic deficit with any designation of the form ‘S knows that p’ in that it 
omits the crucial matter of what S needs to know in order to understand and make sense of p.  
Similarly, to say that ‘S knows how to x’ is merely to denote one manifest outcome of what S 
knows while leaving unanswered the question of what it is S knows. 
Elsewhere (Lum, 2009) I have drawn attention to parallels between Searle’s notion of 
Background and approaches in phenomenology which emphasise the intentionality or 
directedness of knowledgeable states.15  Probably the fullest expression of this approach is to 
be found in Martin Heidegger’s (1962) famous ‘analytic of Dasein’, the ‘there-being’ of 
human existence which, I have suggested, allows a far more coherent account of knowledge 
and expertise than is possible within the Rylean scheme of things.  There is not space here to 
rehearse such an account in detail but suffice it to say that on this view, to learn or to become 
expert is first and foremost about the learner having disclosed to them a ‘world’ of 
interconnected meanings and involvements; we might, for example, think of the ‘worlds’ of 
mathematics, literature, fine art, engineering, motherhood, medicine, playing chess, and so 
on.  On this view, what the technician and the driver have in common is that each is able to 
make sense of the particular ‘world’ in which they operate.  Each has an understanding of the 
priorities and purposes of that world, is able to cope and find his way around in it, recognise 
things as certain things and understand the connections between them.  Each will have 
appropriate expectations, an understanding of possible scenarios, likely outcomes, and so on.  
In the absence of such knowledge, acts and utterances are no more than mechanical 
behaviours, such as might be learnt by rote or merely parroted. 
We should have no objection to referring to this knowledgeable coping as ‘know how’ were 
it not for the fact that this will be taken by some to imply one particular kind of knowledge: 
i.e. a knowing how as opposed to a knowing that.  Importantly, this same knowledge is 
fundamental both to purposeful action and the meaningful use of propositions.  So neither 
could we feasibly conceive of this knowledge as a ‘knowing that’.  Indeed, given that the 
epistemic content of any ‘knowing that’ construction is in large part constituted of this 
knowledge, to characterise it as ‘knowledge that’ would simply invoke a regress whereby in 
order to ‘know that x’ we would need to ‘know that y’, and in order to ‘know that y’... etc.  
Certainly, part of what is known will involve knowing how things should be done but neither 
this, nor the fact that we might couch this in terms of knowing that there is a way to do 
something, does anything to support the dual knowledge thesis or the claim that one 
ostensible form of knowledge is a species of the other.  That the knowledge at issue cannot 
readily be accommodated into an account centred on acts and utterances might, for some, 
suggest a third kind of knowledge, something akin to acquaintance.16  But on the view 
presented here, far from being additional to the knowledge which enables us to do and say 
things, knowledge gained by acquaintance should properly be regarded as part of the doxastic 
ground, i.e. the complex of beliefs, which enables us to produce meaningful acts and 
utterances.  In this sense, knowledge gained from acquaintance underpins both my ‘knowing 
that’ this apple is red, and my ‘knowing how’ to tighten a screw the right amount, which 
again militates against the feasibility of the assumption that that these two terms represent 
two distinct forms of knowledge. 
Ryle was right to dismiss as mistaken the idea that to perform intelligently is ‘to do a bit of 
theory and then to do a bit of practice’ (1949, p. 29).  The terms theory and practice, like 
knowing how and knowing that, can be used to indicate how a person’s knowledge is made 
manifest, such as when we say of someone that they ‘know the theory’ or ‘know the practice’ 
of something, again – at the risk of labouring the point – by way of indicating the difference 
between knowing one thing and knowing another.  But the terms ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ 
have another connotation in education, for they are also used to signify the manner of 
learning, such as when we want to differentiate learning from a text from learning by means 
of a practical exercise.17   Again, the distinction is not clear-cut, for just as not all 
manifestations of knowledge can be categorised as being either act or utterance, similarly 
with the separation of provision into the theoretical and the practical.  The best ‘theoretical’ 
provision may sometimes be that which has the most acute practical relevance, the best 
‘practical’ provision that which most enhances the learner’s understanding of things.  
Certainly we can expect different things to be learnt from different modes of provision.  The 
mistake is to assume that this can be taken as signifying two different kinds of knowledge.  
Knowledge, I want to suggest, can no more be categorised by its sources than by its 
manifestations.18 
 
CONCLUSION 
The upshot of this is that although the KH/KT distinction has some limited viability in the 
context of knowledge attribution it is simply not viable as an epistemological distinction.  
This is by no means merely of theoretical import for the idea that there are two fundamentally 
different kinds of knowledge can be seen to be of very real consequence for education.  
Nowhere is this more evident than in vocational and professional education where the effects 
this dichotomous way of thinking can be seen to have a number of profoundly negative 
effects.  In the context of assessment, the association of third person knowledge attributions 
with explicit acts and utterances has an irresistible bureaucratic and managerial appeal.  It 
allows educational achievements to be specified in exact and explicit terms: the learner will 
‘know how to ...’ or ‘know that ...’ and couched in these terms the assessment process 
appears deceptively simple, requiring only simple judgements of identity.  This is, of course, 
precisely the thinking that lies behind the current vogue for ‘outcomes’, ‘competencies’ and 
‘skills’.  The difficulty, as we have seen, is that such judgements are simply inadequate in 
high stakes circumstances when it is vital to determine what learners actually know.  First, 
because arrangements of this kind cannot provide the best estimation of knowledge, and 
second, because such arrangements can have the effect of requiring assessors to record results 
in the face of contrary indications and against their better judgement.19  
 
But it is in connection with matters of provision and curriculum design that this dichotomous 
conception of knowledge stands to have the most detrimental effects. It hardly needs to be 
said that both theoretical and practical modes of provision have an indispensible part to play 
in the development of occupational expertise.  Difficulties arise when it is assumed that the 
purpose of each is to provide a different kind of knowledge.  First, because this is to lose 
sight of the important sense in which both kinds of provision should contribute to the 
knowledge that is substantively at issue.  To lose sight of this is to risk theoretical provision 
drifting into irrelevance, theory for theory’s sake, and practical provision being reduced to 
instilling rote behaviours.  Second, it becomes a moot point which of the two ostensible 
forms of knowledge should have priority. While some will insist that the facility to act is all 
important, to know how to ‘do the job’, others will be adamant that it is ‘theory’, knowing 
that, that is the wellspring of expertise.  In the UK we need look no further than the training 
of nurses and teachers to witness the ill effects of this dichotomous conception of knowledge; 
while nurse education has moved from the hospital ward to the university, teacher training is 
purposefully being shifted in the opposite direction, away from the university to the 
workplace.  Such confusions at the level of national policy betray deep-seated attachments to 
the dual knowledge thesis and erroneous assumptions about the relative importance of one 
ostensible form of knowledge over the other.  The truth is, of course, that properly conceived 
both modes of provision should have a vital role in developing the capabilities at issue.  
Indeed, perhaps the most serious danger posed by dual knowledge thesis is that it could 
encourage the thought that it is possible to dispense with one form of knowledge altogether.  
There are no doubt many who would concur with David Carr when he concludes his analysis 
of ‘knowledge in practice’ with the following observation: 
 
A profound mistake is made in supposing that the best way to turn an apprentice into a master plumber is 
to instruct him in the complete theory of hydraulics, for the practical knowledge that the apprentice 
requires comes with initiation into and mastery of practical rather than theoretical discourse.  
(Carr, 1981, p. 61) 
 
The difficult with this is that it simply does not square with reality.  It risks grossly 
misrepresenting the nature and extent both of the knowledge required and of the enterprise 
needed to provide that knowledge.  It encourages the thought that the apprentice has no need 
of formal ‘theoretical’ provision, no need of systematised knowledge, and that the emphasis 
should properly be on doing rather than thinking.   
 
The longstanding assumption that there are two kinds of knowledge, a ‘knowing how’ and a 
‘knowing that’ is not only epistemologically incoherent but potentially of profound detriment 
to education.  Although there is little evidence that education policy makers of late have ever 
taken their lead from philosophy, it would be unrealistic to expect education to dispense with 
ill-conceived and unfeasible ways of thinking about knowledge if those same ways of 
thinking continue to pervade the philosophic literature.   
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NOTES 
1. Ryle himself acknowledges that the kind of understanding at issue ‘does not consist in inferring, or guessing, 
the alleged inner-life precursors of overt actions’ (1949, p. 54). Indeed, he emphasises repeatedly that the 
process is not one of inference.   
2. See, for example, M.L.J  Abercrombie’s (1989) classic account of empirical work in this area, demonstrating 
the important role of judgement in perception. 
3. It would be a mistake to characterise the difference between these two forms of judgement in terms of 
objectivity/subjectivity; in education there is often resort to this way of thinking.  Rather, the difference between 
the two approaches consists in the stance taken towards the evidence, either confirming the presence of 
predetermined evidence, or alternatively being open to any and all relevant evidence.  To characterise the latter 
as ‘subjective’ is to miss the point that judgments based on the fullest range of evidence always provide the best 
indication of what a person knows (see Lum, 2012). 
4. On this point see Rorty (1980) and Lum (2009).  Ryle is far from consistent on this score, as when he 
declares:  ‘Of course it is part of my general thesis that the supposed occult processes are themselves mythical; 
there exists nothing to be the object of the postulated diagnoses’ (Ryle, 1949, p 54), thus perhaps leaning more 
towards a potential interpretative role for the observer. 
5. This is presumably what Bengson and Moffett (2011a) have in mind when they note: ‘What is distinctive of 
anti-intellectualism is its commitment to the thesis that knowing how requires the corresponding ability or 
disposition’ (original emphasis; p. 167). 
6. Although widely used in this connection in the literature, the term ‘ability’ is unhelpfully prone to ambiguity.  
On one reading, ‘ability’ might reasonably be interpreted as indicating that which equips a person to perform in 
a particular way, the wherewithal to act, so to speak. In contrast, what is at issue here are the ‘overt acts’ that are 
the outward manifestations of knowing. 
7. Bengson and Moffett (2007), for example, describe it as ‘rather puzzling’ (p. 32). 
8. The failure to acknowledge this simple point is the cause of no end of puzzlement in the literature.  Bengson 
and Moffett (2011a), for example, contrast Pat (who cannot ski but can teach ski stunts) with Albert (who 
similarly cannot ski but ‘knows the theory’ of skiing). On Bengson and Moffett’s analysis ‘...Pat and Albert 
both know how one does the stunts; neither is able to do the stunts. But plainly a significant difference remains: 
only Pat knows how to do the stunts’ (original emphasis, p. 169).   It is perhaps somewhat disingenuous to 
suggest first that both Pat and Albert know the same thing in virtue of knowing ‘how one does the stunts’ only 
then to declare that that there is a ‘significant difference’ between what each knows.  This manoeuvring is 
justified by reference to supposed differences between such locutions as ‘knowing how one φ-s’ and ‘knowing 
how to φ’.  A more coherent analysis would simply acknowledge that what each knows is different.  Pat knows 
how to teach others to do stunts and Albert knows how to make sense of, perhaps recite, certain theoretical 
information about skiing – and each is different again from someone who could actually perform the stunts.  
Certainly if Pat knows some of the theory that Albert knows then to that extent they could be said to know the 
same thing.  But beyond this what each knows is obviously very different and it is misleading to say that they 
‘both know how one does the stunts’. 
Similarly with Stanley and Williamson’s attempt to construct Gettier-style counterexamples for instances 
of knowing how:  
Bob wants to learn how to fly in a flight simulator. He is instructed by Henry. Unknown to Bob, Henry is a malicious 
imposter who has inserted a randomising device in the simulator’s controls and intends to give all kinds of incorrect 
advice. Fortunately, by sheer chance the randomising device causes exactly the same results in the simulator as 
would have occurred without it, and by incompetence Henry gives exactly the same advice as a proper instructor 
would have done. Bob passes the course with flying colors. He has still not flown a real plane. Bob has a justified 
true belief about how to fly. But there is a good sense that he does not know how to fly... 
(S and W, 2001, p. 435) 
Yet it is clearly not the case that the presence of the randomising device undermines Bob’s claim to 
knowledge.  Presuming that he performed just as any knowledgeable pilot would have done then the presence of 
the device is neither here nor there.  A person’s knowledge of how to drive a car is not thrown into question by a 
malicious but failed attempt to tamper with the car’s controls.  And if that person learned to drive in a car 
that had been altered then they would know how to drive that car.  Putting aside the apparent suggestion that 
knowing how to fly somehow equates to following advice, again we can see this as a case of failing to recognise 
the difference between knowing one thing and knowing another.  There is clearly a difference between knowing 
how to: (i) follow advice (whether correct or incorrect), (ii) distinguish correct from incorrect advice, (iii) fly 
correctly (in simulation) given certain correct advice, (iv) fly correctly without need of advice ... etc.  
9.  Confusions arising from this kind of ambiguity abound in the literature. Take, for example, the following: 
A guitar teacher might know how to play well, but lack the ability to play well. Perhaps he’s uncoordinated or never 
practices. Further, his ability to play might improve with practice, even as his know how remains constant. So, his 
know-how doesn’t reduce to the corresponding ability. 
(Alter, 2001, pp. 232-3) 
In what possible sense could the guitar teacher be said to ‘know how to play well’ if he cannot play well?  Are 
we to take it that by ‘know how’ is meant the knowledge needed to teach others to play well, or is it perhaps 
knowledge of what he should do in order to play well?  But then the claim that this know-how ‘does not reduce 
to the corresponding ability’ appears incoherent, if by ‘ability’ is meant his ability to play the guitar rather than, 
say, teach it.   
10.  We can take it that without this corrective Ryle would have difficulties with a case such as this. 
11. Compare this with Bengson and Moffett’s (2007) claim that ‘there is no reading of the following sentence on 
which it is not contradictory: Irina knows how to do a quintuple salchow, but she doesn’t know how to do a 
quintuple salchow’ (p. 39).  In point of fact there are readings which would render this sentence non-
contradictory.  The difficulty with a construction such as this is not that it is necessarily contradictory but that it 
fails to convey what it purports to convey: the sense in which Irina does know and the sense in which she does 
not know. 
12. The point here is that judgements of significance include the evidence upon which judgements of identity 
are based in addition to whatever other evidence is deemed significant. 
13. This in part explains what Bengson and Moffett (2007) see as the ‘peculiar behaviour of know-how 
attributions’ (p. 40), why they sometimes entail ability attributions and sometimes do not.  Bengson and 
Moffett’s proposed solution to this ‘puzzle’, centres on ‘concept possession’ (2007, p. 55) on the part of the 
knower.  But pace Bengson and Moffett, we can see that the matter hinges not on the presence or otherwise of 
any particular epistemic characteristic but, rather, on the kind of judgement upon which attributions of 
knowledge are based.  Moreover, as I have explained elsewhere, contrary to longstanding traditions in analytic 
philosophy there are profound difficulties with resorting to the notion of ‘concepts’ understood as discrete 
constituents of knowledge (see Lum, 2015). 
14.  Accordingly, while some, such as Ryle, adopt a conceptually thin notion of knowing that, others opt to 
reverse this priority, characterising knowing how as mere behaviour and portraying knowing that in 
conceptually thick terms (for an extended account this see Lum (2009) ch. 3) 
15. In Lum (2009) I develop at length an account of occupational expertise which draws on diverse theoretical 
perspectives in analytic philosophy, phenomenology and psychology of perception. 
16.  The notion of knowledge by acquaintance has a lengthy provenance from Plato through William James to 
Bertrand Russell who distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description 
according to their source.  For a recent account of the educational implications of knowledge by acquaintance 
understood as a third form of knowledge see Winch (2013). 
17.  I have suggested elsewhere that we might usefully refer to the modes of learning and the manifestations of 
knowing respectively as the antecedent and consequent conditions of learning (see Lum, 2007). 
18. It is patently the case that knowledge gained from a textual or theoretical source can manifest in the ability 
to do something practical, and equally, knowledge gained by practical or experiential means can manifest in a 
person’s being able to say certain things, answer questions, etc. 
19. The point here is that high stakes assessment should properly employ judgements of significance which are 
often not amenable to being couched in terms of acts and utterances, i.e. knowing how and knowing that. 
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